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Abstract
This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneﬁcial for banks to engage in
circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure,
it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can signiﬁcantly increase
the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the
interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to
attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guar-
antees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected,
and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for
the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the
run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.
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The 2008-2009 ﬁnancial crisis has prompted many questions about the resilience of
the interbank market. Strong growth in the size and density of the interbank network
has made concerns such as "too big to fail" and "too interconnected to fail" widespread.1
However, there is only scarce knowledge of why banks enter into such a high degree of
connectivity in the ﬁrst place, especially since these connections often include cyclical
liabilities that could potentially be netted out.
The goal of this paper is to ﬁll this gap in the literature. Our model shows that it
can be beneﬁcial for banks to be highly interconnected and even to enter into cyclical
liabilities. We claim that this interbank network serves as an insurance mechanism for
bank creditors if they are not already covered by deposit insurance (e.g., the FDIC). If a
bank failure occurs and there is a nonzero probability that banks will be bailed out by the
government, connections to other banks (e.g., exposures arising from credit default swap
(CDS) contracts, bonds, and interbank lending), particularly cyclical liabilities, increase
the expected repayment of uninsured creditors.2
The mechanism presented in this paper diﬀers from the eﬀects of government bailouts
on bank behavior considered in the literature so far. It is well known that the possibility
of a government bailout increases the potential for moral hazard at the individual bank
level. Moreover, it has been argued that banks try to increase the probability of a bailout
by becoming very large and/or highly interconnected (e.g., Freixas, 1999). We show that,
even if we abstract from these two moral hazard channels, there is still an incentive for
banks to be highly interconnected since this increases the value of government bailouts
for individual banks by transferring wealth from the government to the private sector.
Even with a constant, exogenously given bailout probability (i.e., a bailout probability
that is not increasing in either balance sheet size, interconnectedness, or the number of
failing banks), we show that the wealth transfer from the government to the private
sector increases with the degree of interconnectedness. In a nutshell, cyclical interbank
connections increase banks’ liabilities and thus increase the amount of cash governments
have to inject to bail out banks. This extra cash trickles down to other banks in the
network, beneﬁting them and their creditors. This result holds even if we allow the
interbank market to exist for a diﬀerent reason (e.g., liquidity coinsurance). Due to the
resulting high interconnectedness, banks lend large amounts among themselves, leading
to increased leverage for each bank and high systemic risk.
Given that cycle ﬂows create an additional transfer from the government to the private
sector, in a second step we analyze how banks can optimally exploit these transfers. By
creating high interbank exposure and by investing in risky, correlated assets, banks can
maximize the government subsidy per invested unit of capital. This investment behavior
can be solely attributed to cycle ﬂows in the interbank market and does not rely on
the conjecture that the individual bailout probability is potentially increasing with the
1See Minoiu and Reyes (2011), who explore the properties of the global banking network during
1978-2010 and assess its dynamics during ﬁnancial crises.
2Note that high interconnectedness implies many cyclical liabilities (e.g., Takács, 1988).
2number of failing banks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007); that is, such behavior is still
prevalent for a constant, exogenously given bailout probability.
Understanding the interdependence between investment behavior and interbank con-
nections is crucial, since systemic risk not only arises from bank interconnectedness but
also results from a "joint failure risk arising from the correlation of returns on the asset
side of bank balance sheets" (Acharya, 2009, p. 225). In essence, the mechanism pre-
sented in this paper provides an incentive for banks to increase both types of systemic
risk. Moreover, we show that these types of risk cannot be considered individually, since
the beneﬁts from high interconnectedness are maximized by investing in correlated loan
portfolios. Therefore, our model helps explain why banks invested in risky correlated
investments (e.g., US subprime loans) in the run-up to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
related literature. Using a simple example, Section 3 shows how cycle ﬂows create an
additional wealth transfer from the government to the private sector in case there is a
positive bailout probability. Sections 4 and 5 develop our main model and determine how
banks can maximize the value of government bailouts. Section 6 provides two extensions
of our main model. First, we extend our model to a three-region economy and compare
diﬀerent network structures. Second, we introduce risk aversion and show that our main
results are unaﬀected. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related literature
Our paper is related to several strands of the theoretical literature. First, it adds
to the literature on liquidity and interbank markets. Pioneering work in this area has
been accomplished by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), who show that banks can coinsure
each other through an interbank market against liquidity shocks as long as these shocks
are not perfectly correlated. This theme has been taken on by many other papers. For
example, Freixas and Holthausen (2005) analyze the scope for international interbank
market integration when cross-border information about banks is less precise than home
country information. Here, banks can cope with these shocks by investing in a storage
technology or can use the interbank market to channel liquidity. Allen, Carletti, and
Gale (2009) show that the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility
if there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks. Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, and Lóránth (2011) show that there exists a negative
relation between a bank’s activity in the interbank market and its bank capital because
it is optimal for banks to postpone payouts to investors when they are hit by liquidity
shocks that cannot be coinsured in the interbank market, in which case interbank activity
is low.
In addition, our paper is related to the literature on ﬁnancial contagion. In Section
6.2, we incorporate our modeling idea into a model setup originally proposed by Allen
and Gale (2000). This framework is used by many papers (e.g., Freixas, Parigi, and
Rochet, 2000; Leitner, 2005; Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007). Therefore, we show that
the results we ﬁnd in our main model under the assumption of risk neutrality remain
valid when incorporated into a setup of the type proposed by Allen and Gale (2000) and
3Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). Similar to these papers, we see the interbank market
as an insurance mechanism. In these previous studies, the interbank market is supposed
to insure banks against liquidity shocks that result from depositors already withdrawing
their money in an intermediate period. In our setting an additional insurance mechanism
results from the fact that if a bank is connected to other banks, the expected repayment
to uninsured creditors increases in case the bank defaults. The reason is that even if this
speciﬁc bank is not bailed out, there nevertheless exists a positive probability that the
next bank in the chain will be. If markets have reached a high network density with high
capital ﬂows, implying that many and large cycle ﬂows exist, then ultimately the failing
bank will receive funds from banks it is connected to if they are bailed out.
Lastly, our paper relates to the literature on bank bailouts. Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2007) focus on whether governments have an incentive to bail out banks ex post if they
engaged in herding behavior ex ante. Diamond and Rajan (2002) show that bailouts
alter available liquidity in the economy and distinguish between well targeted bailouts
(which can be beneﬁcial) and poorly targeted ones that can lead to a systemic crisis.
Gorton and Huang (2004) argue that there is a potential role for governments to provide
liquidity through, for example, bank bailouts to reduce the problem of agents hoarding
liquidity ineﬃciently. In contrast to these studies, we use a constant exogenously given
bailout probability to avoid mingling the mechanism presented in this paper with the
incentive to become interconnected that results from an increase in the individual bailout
probability. Leitner (2005) and David and Lehar (2011) show that interbank linkages
can be optimal ex ante because they act as a commitment device to facilitate mutual
private sector bailouts. In contrast, we investigate the eﬀect of government bailouts on
the incentives of banks to create such liabilities.
Our paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for several empirical ﬁndings.
There is ample evidence that the global banking network has a very high density and
a high degree of concentration. Using locational statistics from the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) on exchange-rate adjusted changes in cross-border bank claims,
Minoiu and Reyes (2011) analyze the global banking network and ﬁnd that, besides a high
network density, there exists a positive correlation between network density and the cir-
cularity of liabilities (measured by the network’s clustering coeﬃcient). For the overnight
market in the United Kingdom, Soramäki, Wetherlit, and Zimmermann (2010) ﬁnd that
the net lending/borrowing amounts are much lower than the gross trades, implying many
cyclical liabilities in this market. Kubelec and Sá (2010) show that the interconnectivity
of the global ﬁnancial network has increased signiﬁcantly over the past two decades. In
line with our results, they ﬁnd that the global ﬁnancial network is characterized by a
large number of small links and a small number of large links and that the network has
become more clustered. Similar evidence can be found for national interbank markets
(Wells, 2004; Mueller, 2006; Arnold, Bech, Beyeler, Glass, and Soramäki, 2006). Fur-
thermore, there is also a very high interconnectedness in other interbank markets besides
the traditional interbank lending market. For example, a 2011 report by the Bank for
International Settlements shows that banks also have very high cross-exposures due to
derivative contracts (mainly CDSs), since banks that sell CDSs in turn also purchase them
to hedge their risk.
43. Main idea
To illustrate how cycle ﬂows create an additional wealth transfer from the government
to the private sector, we use a very simple framework similar to that of Rotemberg
(2011). The main model then analyzes how banks can optimally exploit this mechanism
to maximize the expected value of government bailouts. We assume that the interbank
market consists of a few core banks and some uninsured creditors (e.g., mutual funds,
bondholders, regional banks). One of the core banks has an investment project that costs
one unit in the ﬁrst period and generates a return R > 1 in the second period with
probability λ and a return of zero otherwise. The only source of capital to fund this
project is to borrow from the uninsured creditors. In return for the initial funding, the
bank must repay RD to its uninsured creditor. All parties are risk-neutral.
We develop the intuition of our mechanism in two steps. First, we discuss a situation
without network connections to other core banks. At t = 0 the bank (BA) borrows one
unit from the uninsured creditor (C) and invests in a project (P). In the second period,
the cash ﬂow from the project is realized. If the project is successful, the bank receives
an amount R and is able to fully repay its uninsured creditor. If the project fails and the
bank is not bailed out, the uninsured creditor receives no repayment. Conversely, if the
government bails out the bank (i.e., takes over the bank and settles all its liabilities), the
creditor again receives his full repayment (see Fig. 1).
0 t  1 t 
1 1 A B C P
G
failure – bailout  
0 A B C P
D R
D R
failure – no bailout  
0 A B C P 0
D R R A B C P
success
Figure 1: Capital ﬂows without interbank market
In a second step, we allow the bank to establish an interbank network at t = 0 by
lending one unit of capital, that for example BA receives from its uninsured creditor, in a
circular way. To be precise, bank BA lends one unit of capital to bank BB, which in turn
lends it to bank BC, from which the capital ﬂows back to BA and is then invested into the
project. For now, we assume that banks BB and BC do not have any other investments.
We relax this assumption in the next Sections. Moreover, for ease of illustration, we
assume that the gross interest rate on the interbank market is RD as well. If the project
5is successful, BA receives the project return R and uses it to settle its liabilities with BC.3
After receiving the payment from BB, BA repays its uninsured creditor. If the project
fails, bank BA defaults since it cannot repay its creditors. If the government steps in
and bails out bank BA, both the uninsured creditor of BA and bank BC receive their full
repayment RD, implying that all claims are settled in this case. If the government refuses
to bail out BA, BC defaults as well. Now it depends on whether the government (not
necessarily the same one as in the case of BA, since BC could be established in another
country) bails out BC. If it does, it takes over BC and settles its liabilities. Therefore, BB
receives RD from BC and hence BB can pay back its debt to BA. However, BA has total
liabilities of 2RD and is therefore still unable to meet all its obligations. Consequently,
the funds BA received from BB must be divided among the creditors of BA, that is, the
uninsured creditor of BA, on the one hand, and BC, on the other hand.
0 t  1 t 
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1 1
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D R
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Figure 2: Capital ﬂows with interbank market
The common procedure in bankruptcy proceedings is for debt to be paid back on a
pro rata basis once a default occurs. Therefore, the uninsured creditor of BA and bank
BC both receive 1/2RD. Hence, even though the uninsured creditor’s own bank fails and
is not bailed out, he receives a positive repayment due to the existence of the interbank
network. Since the government takes over BC, it receives the 1/2RD from BC. However,
it has to pay RD to bail out the bank and hence records a loss of 1/2RD. The case in
which BC is not bailed out but BB is can be described analogously. The corresponding
cash ﬂows are presented in Fig. 2. Hence, in case there is a positive probability of a
government bailout if a bank defaults, the bank can considerably increase the expected
3Throughout the paper we assume that, as soon as there exists a clearing payment vector, the banks
use this vector to settle all liabilities in the network. If the sequence of payments is chosen in a less
sophisticated manner, banks can still default, even though there is enough liquidity in the system to
settle all claims. However, an unsophisticated settlement process would only reinforce our mechanism,
since it would increase the value of the government’s implicit guarantee.
6repayment of its uninsured creditor by ﬁrst channeling funds through the interbank market
and only lending them out to the ultimate borrower afterwards. The reason is that, with
an interbank market in place, the uninsured creditor receives a positive repayment as soon
as at least one of the banks is bailed out.
If the bank has the bargaining power, creditors will demand a lower interest rate
(risk premium) given the existence of an interbank network (the participation constraint
of uninsured creditors is already binding for lower values of RD), which considerably
reduces the bank’s borrowing cost. This reduction in turn leads to higher proﬁts for the
bank, which can help explain the comparatively high return-on-equity ratios of banks. If,
on the other hand, the uninsured creditor has the bargaining power, he will increase his
expected repayment by increasing RD until the participation constraint of the owners of
the bank is just binding. Furthermore, creditors will only deposit money in banks that
are part of a highly connected interbank network, since the expected repayment in this
case is higher than when the bank is not connected to others via an interbank market.
Note that the described mechanism can be reinforced by channeling more than one
unit of capital through the interbank market. For example, this can be realized by re-
peating the circular lending procedure a couple of times (e.g., K repetitions lead to an
interbank network exposure of K). Thereby, the expected repayment to the uninsured
creditor increases even further. Moreover, it is easy to see that the expected repayment
to the uninsured creditor can also be increased by increasing the number of banks in the
interbank network.
4. The main model
Having described how cycle ﬂows create an additional wealth transfer from the govern-
ment to the private sector, we now investigate how banks can use cycle ﬂows to optimally
exploit implicit bailout guarantees. We consider an economy that consists of two dates
t = 0 and t = 1 and two diﬀerent regions, A and B (which can be interpreted as, e.g.,
two diﬀerent countries). Each region is comprised of a continuum of identical banks. We
assume that, due to competition, all banks adopt the same behavior and can thus be
described by a representative bank (protected by limited liability). The representative
bank in region A (B) is denoted by BA (BB). In line with Allen and Gale (2000), these
banks can establish an interbank market (network) by exchanging an arbitrary amount
of interbank deposits K at t = 0 in return for a payment of KRD at t = 1. This setup
is a simpliﬁed approach to model the cycle ﬂows that otherwise result from a high degree
of market density.4
Furthermore, we assume that there exists an uninsured creditor (endowed with c units
of capital at date t = 0) and one investor who provides equity ﬁnancing to the bank in
each region. Creditors are denoted CA and CB in regions A and B, respectively. This
4Note, however, that there exists some anecdotal evidence from German Landesbanks that even this
kind of bilateral circular lending exists on the interbank market. For example, a 2006 report by Fitch
describes that after the abolition of the explicit state guarantee, Landesbanks bought bonds from each
other in large amounts, thereby creating cyclical liabilities bilaterally.
7contract takes the form of a standard debt contract; that is, it cannot be made contingent
on either the realization of the investment or the realization of the state of nature. All
actors are risk neutral.
We consider a situation in which each bank has access to two investment possibilities
in two diﬀerent industries (denoted 1 and 2), as in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007).
Both investments need an initial amount of one unit of capital. One can think of these
investment opportunities as portfolios of loans to ﬁrms in one of the two industries. More
precisely, bank BA (BB) can lend to ﬁrms in industry A1 or A2 (B1 and B2). If in
equilibrium banks decide to lend to ﬁrms in the same industry, that is, they either lend
to A1 and B1 or to A2 and B2, then the returns of their loan portfolios are assumed to
be perfectly correlated (ρ = 1). However, if they decide to invest in diﬀerent industries,
we assume that the returns are uncorrelated (ρ = 0).
The investment opportunities are only available at date t = 0. Both portfolios generate
a return of R with probability λ or a return of zero with probability (1 − λ) at t = 1.
Note that we assume that the investment opportunities have a positive net present value
(NPV), that is, λR > 1, and that λ ≥ 1/2. The latter can be motivated by considering
the Value at Risk constraint of the Basel Accord, which states that banks must choose a
minimum quality for their loan portfolio to limit their default probability. Consequently,
the decision in which industry to invest only aﬀects the correlation of returns, but not
their magnitude. This structure allows us to determine whether interbank connections
incentivize banks to invest in correlated investments.
Finally, to model risk-neutral investors we follow Allen and Gale (2005) and Brusco
and Castiglionesi (2007) in that we assume that the equity investor IA (IB) in region A
(B) is endowed with e units of capital at t = 0 and has no endowment at date t = 1. He
can use his endowment for either consumption or to buy bank shares. In the latter case
the investor is entitled to receive dividends at t = 1 (denoted by d1). His utility is then
given by
u(d0,d1) = d0λR + d1 (1)
Since an investor can obtain a utility of eλR by immediately consuming his initial endow-
ment (consumption at t = 0 is denoted by d0), he has to earn an expected return of at
least λR on the invested capital to give up consumption at date t = 0. By investing an
amount e0 at t = 0, the equity investor obtains a lifetime utility of (e−e0)λR+d1. Hence,
the investor will only buy bank shares if the expected utility from doing so is higher than
the utility he would get from immediately consuming his endowment, that is, if
(e − e0)λR + E[d1] ≥ eλR (2)
holds. This setup leads to the following participation constraint for investors:
E[d1] ≥ λe0R (3)
Under the assumption of perfect competition in the banking market (i.e., creditors have
all the bargaining power), this constraint will be binding. Hence, the total amount of
funds provided to the bank is given by c+e0 = 1. Due to the prevailing capital structure
8of banks, we assume that c > e0, that is, that the bank has more debt than equity. From
now on we will suppress the time index. The timing of our model is depicted in Fig. 3.
Investors provide equity eo
Banks exchange K
Banks raise debt capital c
Banks invest in loan portfolio
t = 0
Cash ﬂows are realized
Possibly government bailouts
t = 1
Figure 3: Timing of the model
If both investments are successful, the banks are able to settle their interbank claims,
repay the uninsured creditors, and pay the investors a positive dividend. If, however,
the investment of one or both banks fails, either one or both banks may not be able to
meet their liabilities and will consequently default. In case of a default, we assume that
there is a positive probability α that the government of the respective country will step in
and bail out the bank, that is, take over the bank and repay all its liabilities.5 However,
as soon as the bank reaches a critical size, it becomes too big to save and therefore
its bailout becomes impossible and α drops to zero. It would be reasonable to assume
that α is initially increasing in the interconnectedness of the bank (too interconnected
to fail), its balance sheet size (too big to fail), and the number of failing banks (too
many to fail). However, to isolate the direct eﬀect that cycle ﬂows have on the expected
repayment of uninsured creditors, we assume that the bailout probability is not increasing
in either the balance sheet size of the bank or its interconnectedness or the number of
failing banks. Making the bailout probability increasing with one of these factors would
reinforce our results, since then high interconnectedness increases the wealth transfer from
the government to the private sector even further. However, we capture the argument of
being too big to save by assuming that the bailout probability becomes zero as soon as a
bank’s balance sheet exceeds a critical threshold L >> R. If the bank’s liabilities reach
this threshold, the government will no longer be able to provide enough capital to bail it
out.6 Therefore, α becomes
α =
(
αB if (c + K)RD ≤ L
0 if (c + K)RD > L (4)
5The bailout probabilities for diﬀerent banks are probably correlated. However, for our mechanism
to work, it is suﬃcient that the bailout probabilities are not perfectly correlated, which is certainly true if
the banks are established in diﬀerent countries. Furthermore, during the recent crisis, the bailout of Bear
Stearns, and the default of Lehman Brothers show that bailout decisions are also not perfectly correlated
within the same country.
6This assumption is supported by the ﬁndings of Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011). These
authors show that ﬁnancial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are linked. On the day of the
announcement of large bailouts, the CDS spreads on government bonds rose signiﬁcantly. If a government
has to spend very high amounts to rescue a bank, it becomes virtually impossible to obtain funding for
this bailout at acceptable terms. Thus, once a bank is too large, it can no longer be rescued.
9Consequently, the payments to the uninsured creditors and investors depend on the
performance of the loan portfolio and on whether a bank is bailed out if a default occurs.
To ensure consistency with our extension that considers risk-averse creditors, we assume
here that the creditors have all the bargaining power. Due to perfect competition in
the banking sector, banks thus seek to maximize the repayment of uninsured creditors by
choosing the parameters RD, ρ, and K. Having described the setup, we now return to our
main questions in this Section: Which level of interconnectedness do banks choose and
do they prefer to invest in correlated or uncorrelated assets to optimally exploit implicit
bailout guarantees?
Both aspects are important to consider, since they both increase systemic risk. On
the one hand, interconnectedness leads to systemic risk resulting from spillover eﬀects
that are transmitted through the interbank market (even without correlation on the asset
side of the banks’ balance sheet). On the other hand, even without being interconnected,
investment correlation increases systemic risk due to possible joined bank failures. The
following analysis investigates the interaction between these two sources of systemic risk
and determines how interconnectedness inﬂuences the banks’ investment decision, that
is, whether they invest in correlated or uncorrelated loan portfolios . To analyze this
issue, we derive the highest expected repayment banks can achieve with an investment
correlation of zero and one, respectively. Then we compare the resulting repayments to
determine which of the two yields a higher return for uninsured creditors.
4.1. Positively correlated investments
Consider ﬁrst the situation in which bank investments are perfectly positively cor-
related, that is, ρ = 1. In this case there are ﬁve diﬀerent outcomes (depending on the
success of the investments and whether the banks are bailed out or not), depicted in Table
1.
ρ = 1 Prob. LA LB BA BB CA CB IA IB
S1 λ S S N N cRD cRD R − cRD R − cRD
S2 (1 − λ)α2 F F B B cRD cRD 0 0
S3 (1 − λ)(1 − α)α F F B N cRD cRD
K
c+K 0 0
S4 (1 − λ)(1 − α)α F F N B cRD
K
c+K cRD 0 0
S5 (1 − λ)(1 − α)2 F F N N 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Capital ﬂows for investment correlation of ρ = 1
Column 1 presents the ﬁve diﬀerent states, while Column 2 presents the probability of
each given state occurring. Columns LA and LB show whether the investments of banks
BA and BB are successful (S) or not (F). Columns BA and BB indicate whether banks
BA and BB are bailed out by the government (B) or not (N). The Columns CA and CB
show the repayment of uninsured creditors, while Columns IA and IB show the dividends
the equity holders receive. To understand the cash ﬂows presented in Table 1, ﬁrst note
that if either both investments are successful (S1) or both banks are bailed out (S2), the
uninsured creditors of both banks will receive their full repayment. These states only
diﬀer with respect to the dividend paid to the investor, since in the case of a bailout the
government takes over the bank and thus has the residual claim. Assuming that equity is
only partially wiped out after a default would only reinforce our results. If only one bank
10is bailed out (S3 and S4), then the creditor of this bank will receive the full repayment
whereas the creditor of the other bank will still receive a fraction K/(c + K) of his claim
cRD, despite the fact that his own bank is not bailed out (network insurance). Since the
model is symmetric, it is suﬃcient to focus on the optimization problem of one of the
banks. Hence, we only analyze the behavior of bank BA. Due to perfect competition,
bank BA wants to maximize the expected repayment to its uninsured creditor CA. Thus,
its optimization problem becomes:
max
RD,K U1 = λcRD + (1 − λ)

αcRD + α(1 − α)cRD
K
c + K

(5)
subject to
E[d1] ≥ λeR (6)
The objective function consists of the following parts: With probability λ the investment
of the bank is successful and creditors receive their contractually speciﬁed repayment cRD.
With probability (1 − λ) the investment fails. In this case the return of the creditors
depends on whether the banks are bailed out or not. Speciﬁcally, if bank BA is bailed out
(which happens with probability α), the government repays all liabilities and hence its
creditors again receive the full repayment. If, however, the government does not bail out
bank BA, the repayment depends on whether bank BB is bailed out. If bank BB is not
bailed out either, the repayment is clearly zero. However, if bank BB is bailed out, the
government injects funds of RD(c+K). This bailout then allows bank BB to settle all its
claims. Therefore, BA receives RDK and has to split these proceeds on a pro rata basis
(it owes money to its uninsured creditor CA and bank BB). Therefore, the uninsured
creditor of bank BA will receive a share c/(c + K) of the funds bank BA received from
BB. Furthermore, the binding participation constraint of the equity holder implies
E[d1] = eλR ⇒ λ(R − cRD) = eλR ⇒ RD = R (7)
Inserting RD = R into Eq. (5) yields the following maximization problem:
max
K U1 = λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)cR
K
c + K

(8)
It will depend on the amount of interbank exposure K whether the government will be
able to fully repay the bank’s liabilities in case of a bailout. Let K1 denote the interbank
exposure where the government is just able to repay all liabilities. This threshold is given
by
K1 =
L
R
− c (9)
In the following we split the amount of interbank deposits into two intervals. For K ∈
[0,K1] (government will be able to repay all liabilities and α = αB) the ﬁrst-order condi-
11tion of the objective function becomes
∂U1
∂K
= R
αB(1 − αB)(1 − λ)c2
(c + K)2 > 0 (10)
If, on the other hand, banks increase their exposure to an even higher level, that is,
K ∈ (K1,∞], then the government will not be able to provide enough funds to settle all
the liabilities of the failed bank and the bailout probability α drops to zero. Hence, the
expected repayment of CA drops to λcR.
Therefore, the expected utility of the uninsured creditors is increasing in K as long
as R(c + K) < L. This result implies that banks will choose an amount of interbank
deposits K = K1 such that R(c + K) = L. Increasing cross-exposure on the interbank
market beyond this threshold decreases the expected repayment of the uninsured creditor.
Therefore, the highest expected utility for the creditor that can be achieved when choosing
a correlation ρ = 1 is given by
U1 = λcR + (1 − λ)
"
αBcR + αB(1 − αB)L
cK1
(c + K1)2
#
(11)
Our ﬁndings can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. If banks choose perfectly correlated investments (given a positive bailout
probability), they will increase their interbank exposure up to the threshold K = K1, such
that their total liabilities equal L, that is, to a level that makes it just possible to bail them
out in case of default.
Proof The proof follows from the previous discussion. QED
To understand why it makes sense intuitively to choose such a high level of interbank
deposits, one must consider two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, a higher exposure
increases the funds injected by the government in case of a bailout and hence increases
the funds that can be split among a bank’s creditors (KR). On the other hand, a higher
amount of interbank deposits decreases the fraction that the uninsured creditor of the
bank that is not bailed out receives, since c/(c+K) decreases in K. Since the ﬁrst eﬀect
outweighs the second eﬀect (KRc/(c + K) is increasing in K), banks choose the highest
possible liabilities L.
4.2. Uncorrelated investments
We next turn to the case in which banks decide to invest in diﬀerent industries, that
is, ρ = 0. Here, two scenarios must be considered. On the one hand, the interbank
exposure can be chosen such that even if the one bank’s investment is successful but the
other bank’s investment fails, the ﬁrst bank will be unable to repay its obligations and
hence ﬁnancial contagion will occur. On the other hand, if the exposure is low enough,
a successful bank will stay solvent no matter what happens to the other bank. Let K∗
denote the "switching point", that is, the level of interbank exposure where a successful
bank will just stay solvent, even if the other bank fails (see the Appendix for the derivation
12of K∗). The diﬀerent possibilities for the cash ﬂows are presented in Tables 2 and 3, where
the notation is as described before. It is crucial to note that the interest rate RD diﬀers
between the two possibilities, since the participation constraints of the equity investors
diﬀer. Table 2 presents the cash ﬂows for K ≤ K∗.
ρ = 0 Prob. LA LB BA BB CA CB IA IB
S1 λ2 S S N N cR1
D cR1
D R − cR1
D R − cR1
D
S2 (1 − λ)2α2 F F B B cR1
D cR1
D 0 0
S3 (1 − λ)2(1 − α)α F F B N cR1
D cR1
D
K
c+K 0 0
S4 (1 − λ)2(1 − α)α F F N B cR1
D
K
c+K cR1
D 0 0
S5 (1 − λ)2(1 − α)2 F F N N 0 0 0 0
S6 λ(1 − λ)α S F N B cR1
D cR1
D R − cR1
D 0
S7 λ(1 − λ)α F S B N cR1
D cR1
D 0 R − cR1
D
S8 λ(1 − λ)(1 − α) S F N N cR1
D cR1
D
K
c+K X0 0
S9 λ(1 − λ)(1 − α) F S N N cR1
D
K
c+K cR1
D 0 X0
Table 2: Outcomes for K ≤ K∗, where X0 = R − cR1
D − cR1
D
K
c+K - No contagion
States S1 − S5 parallel the respective outcomes in Table 1. Things diﬀer from the
results of Table 1 if only one investment fails, depending on whether the successful bank
stays solvent (no contagion; see Table 2) or also becomes insolvent (see Table 3). If the
interbank exposure is low enough (K ≤ K∗) such that there is no contagion, then the
successful bank can always fully repay its uninsured creditor, whereas the creditor of the
unsuccessful bank will only receive the full amount if this bank is bailed out (S6 and S7
in Table 2). If the unsuccesfull bank is not bailed out, its creditor will get just a fraction
of his repayment (S8 and S9 in Table 2). If, on the other hand, the interbank exposure is
higher than the threshold K∗, the successful bank will not be able to settle its interbank
liabilities and, on top of that, will be unable to fully repay its creditor. Depending on
which bank (if any) is bailed out, the creditors of both the successful and the failed bank
receive either their full repayment or just a fraction (S6 − S11 in Table 3).
ρ = 0 Prob. LA LB BA BB CA CB IA IB
S1 λ2 S S N N cR2
D cR2
D R − cR2
D R − cR2
D
S2 (1 − λ)2α2 F F B B cR2
D cR2
D 0 0
S3 (1 − λ)2(1 − α)α F F B N cR2
D cR2
D
K
c+K 0 0
S4 (1 − λ)2(1 − α)α F F N B cR2
D
K
c+K cR2
D 0 0
S5 (1 − λ)2(1 − α)2 F F N N 0 0 0 0
S6 λ(1 − λ)α S F N B cR2
D cR2
D R − cR2
D 0
S7 λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)α S F B N cR2
D cR2
D
K
c+K 0 0
S8 λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)2 S F N N R c+K
c+2K R K
c+2K 0 0
S9 λ(1 − λ)α F S B N cR2
D cR2
D 0 R − cR2
D
S10 λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)α F S N B cR2
D
K
c+K cR2
D 0 0
S11 λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)2 F S N N R K
c+2K R c+K
c+2K 0 0
Table 3: Outcomes for K > K∗ - Contagion
In a next step, we compare the expected repayments of the uninsured creditor in these
two scenarios, that is, K ≤ K∗ and K > K∗. We ﬁrst derive the precise values of R1
D (no
contagion) and R2
D (contagion) from the binding participation constraint of the equity
13holder. If K ≤ K∗, we obtain the following from Constraint (6)
λ2(R − cR1
D) + λ(1 − λ)
h
α(R − cR1
D) + (1 − α)

R − cR1
D − cR1
D
K
c+K
i
≥ (1 − c)λR
⇒ R1
D = R c+K
c+2K−K[λ+(1−λ)α] (12)
The exposure K inﬂuences the dividend payment of investor IA in state S8 only (see Table
2). A higher K implies that a higher fraction of the investment return is paid from BA
to BB, which reduces the dividend payment of IA. Thus, to satisfy the equity investor’s
participation constraint, R1
D must be reduced. Due to the symmetry of our model, the
same holds for investor IB.
Conversely, if K > K∗ (contagion case), we obtain
λ
2(R − cR
2
D) + λ(1 − λ)α(R − cR
2
D) ≥ (1 − c)λR
⇒ R
2
D = R
 
λ + (1 − λ)α − (1 − c)
c[λ + (1 − λ)α]
!
(13)
Therefore, as soon as K > K∗, a change in K does not alter the dividend payment to IA
and hence no longer changes the interest rate R2
D, because after the default of BB and
no bailout, BA also defaults. Given our assumptions on λ, c, and e, we can make sure
that 0 < R2
D < R. Plugging the value of R1
D (since we approach K∗ from below) into the
formula for the contagion threshold K∗ in Eq. (85) (see the Appendix) yields
K
∗ =
c(1 − c)
λ + (1 − λ)α − 2(1 − c)
(14)
Hence, there exists a positive interbank exposure K for which the successful bank stays
solvent (in case one bank is successful and the other is not) if
λ + (1 − λ)α − 2(1 − c) > 0 (15)
Conversely, if Condition (15) does not hold, we can restrict our analysis to the contagion
case K > K∗. Therefore, if the investment correlation is zero, the overall utility of the
uninsured creditors (depending on the amount of interbank deposits) is
U0(K ≤ K
∗) = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR
1
D + (1 − λ)(1 − α)[λ + (1 − λ)α]cR
1
D
K
c + K
= [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (16)
U0(K > K
∗) =
h
α(1 + λ) + λ
2(1 − 2α) − α
2λ(1 − λ)
i
cR
2
D + λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2R
+ α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR
2
D
K
c + K
(17)
We now compare the utility of the creditors for the diﬀerent levels of interbank deposits.
In the Appendix, we formally show that banks have an incentive to choose a level of
14interbank deposits
K0 =
L
R2
D
− c (18)
in case (c + K∗)R1
D < L; that is, there exists an interbank exposure for which contagion
occurs and a bailout is still possible. If, on the other hand, (c+K∗)R1
D ≥ L, banks will be
indiﬀerent between all possible interbank exposures in the interval K = [0,K0]. Hence,
if (c + K∗)R1
D < L, the highest expected utility for the uninsured creditor that can be
achieved when choosing a correlation of ρ = 0 is given by
U0 =
h
α(1 + λ) + λ
2(1 − 2α) − α
2λ(1 − λ)
i
cR
2
D + λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2R
+ α(1 − λ)(1 − α)L
cK0
(c + K0)2 (19)
Furthermore, if (c + K∗)R1
D ≥ L, the maximal expected utility becomes
U0 = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (20)
This ﬁnding can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. If banks choose uncorrelated investments (given a positive bailout proba-
bility), two scenarios must be considered:
a) If (c + K∗)R1
D < L, banks will increase their interbank exposure up to the threshold
K = K0,
b) If (c + K∗)R1
D ≥ L, banks will be indiﬀerent between all possible interbank exposures
in the interval K = [0,K0].
Proof See the Appendix. QED
Hence, intuitively, two cases must be distinguished. On the one hand, the level of inter-
bank exposure above which contagion occurs can be low enough so that the bank can
be bailed out ((c + K∗)R1
D < L). Then it is always optimal to increase the interbank
exposure K to a level that just enables the government to bail out the bank (K = K0),
implying that contagion can occur. The reason is that as soon as the interbank exposure
K exceeds the contagion threshold K∗, a change in K no longer alters the interest rate
R2
D. Therefore, the only downside for the bank’s creditor in choosing a higher K is due
to the states in which only the creditor’s own bank is successful. In such cases, higher
interbank exposure implies that a higher fraction of the return generated by that bank is
transferred to the other bank’s creditor. However, the creditor beneﬁts in the same way
in case his own bank fails while the other bank is successful. The beneﬁts and costs of
the respective states add up to zero. An additional upside of a higher K results from the
state in which both banks fail and the other bank is bailed out (as described in Section
4.1). Taken together, these eﬀects incentivize banks to increase their interbank exposure
up to K0.
15If, on the other hand, (c + K∗)R1
D ≥ L, the banks are unable to choose an interbank
exposure that leads to contagion and at the same time allows the government to bail
them out (K ≤ K0 < K∗). In this interval for K, equity investors receive a dividend
payment whenever their own bank is successful. This payment, however, depends only
on the interbank exposure if the other bank fails and is not bailed out. In this state, if
K is increased, R1
D must be reduced. Consequently, this eﬀect will reduce the creditor’s
expected repayment. However, there is also a countervailing eﬀect if the bank increases K.
Due to the eﬀect previously described, an increase in K increases the expected repayment
to the creditor in cases in which the creditor’s own bank fails but the other bank is
either successful or bailed out. These two eﬀects oﬀset each other such that the expected
repayment to the uninsured creditor is independent of the choice of the interbank exposure
in the interval K ≤ K0 < K∗.
4.3. Comparison of correlated and uncorrelated investments
What remains is to show under which correlation structure uninsured creditors receive
a higher expected repayment. In the Appendix we formally prove that U1 > U0 always
holds, implying that banks will always choose perfectly correlated investments. This main
ﬁnding can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. If banks are connected via an interbank market and there is a nonzero
bailout probability, it is optimal for them to invest in correlated assets. Moreover, they
have an incentive to increase their interbank exposure until their total liabilities equal L,
that is, the highest amount that still allows the banks to be bailed out.
Proof See the Appendix. QED
To understand why this result holds, we focus on bank BA. Consider ﬁrst the situation
in which BA has no interbank connections. In this case, the expected inﬂows are the
expected investment returns λR and the expected government cash injection in case the
bank defaults, (1 − λ)αcR. Note that without an interbank network the correlation
structure has no impact on the expected inﬂows. The total expected inﬂows are divided
between the equity investor and the creditor such that the equity holder’s participation
constraint is satisﬁed; that is, the equity investor receives an expected return λeR and the
creditor receives the remaining funds. Therefore, the expected payment to the creditor is
maximized by maximizing the total expected inﬂows.
To analyze the impact of interconnectedness on the optimal correlation structure, we
use the case without interbank connections as a benchmark and compare the beneﬁts of
an interbank network under correlations of zero and one, respectively. Since the expected
investment returns can not be altered by the correlation structure, banks choose the
investment correlation that maximizes the expected cash injections from the governments.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which creditor CA’s own bank BA is successful. In the
case of correlated investments, interbank exposure does not change the payoﬀs to unin-
sured creditors in the success state S1 (Table 1), leaving the interest payment unaﬀected.
However, if investments are uncorrelated, the equity investor has a lower probability of
receiving a dividend payment in comparison to the case without interbank connections,
16since the investor does not receive a payment in the success states S7 and S8 due to
contagious spillover eﬀects on the interbank market (Table 3). Hence, a higher dividend
must be paid in the other success states S1 and S6 to satisfy the investor’s participation
constraint. On that account, the contractually speciﬁed interest rate R2
D must be lowered,
that is, R2
D < R.
The decrease in the interest payment in case of uncorrelated investments leaves the
uninsured creditor worse oﬀ if the project is successful in comparison to a situation without
interbank exposure (states S1, S6, S7, and S8 in Table 3). The overall loss in these states
amounts to:
h
λ
2 + λ(1 − λ)α + λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
i
(cR
2
D − cR)
+
h
λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2
i 
R
c + K
c + 2K
− cR

< 0 (21)
Similarly, in comparison to the situation without an interbank network, CA beneﬁts less
from a bailout of its own bank BA in case of uncorrelated investments (S2, S3, and S9 in
Table 3):
(1 − λ)α

cR
2
D − cR

< 0 , (22)
whereas the beneﬁt from a bailout of BA is again unchanged (S2 and S3 in Table 1), given
correlated investments.
In a next step, we consider those states in which only the other bank (BB) is bailed
out. Apparently, BA beneﬁts under either correlation structure compared to a situation
without network connections. By comparing the expected beneﬁt from the bailout of the
other bank for the case of correlated investments (S4 – left-hand side) and uncorrelated
investments (S4 and S10 – right-hand side) we obtain:
(1 − λ)(1 − α)αcR
K1
c + K1
> (1 − λ)(1 − α)αcR
2
D
K0
c + K0
(23)
This inequality follows from the proof of Proposition 4.3. Hence, by choosing correlated
investments, banks can maximize the amount of funds received from the bailout of the
other bank.
Finally, we consider the case in which only the other bank is successful. Apparently,
this can only happen if banks invest in uncorrelated assets (S11 in Table 3). Without
interbank connections, the failing bank would receive zero in this case, whereas with a
positive interbank exposure it receives:
λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2

R
K
c + 2K

> 0 (24)
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4.3, the drawbacks from choosing an uncorrelated
investment structure shown in Inequalities (21)–(23) outweigh the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt
given in Inequality (24). In the Appendix, we show that investing in correlated portfolios
thus maximizes the expected inﬂows from government bailouts and thereby also maximizes
the expected payment to the creditor.
17In this Section, we demonstrate that banks always have an incentive to increase the
interbank exposure until the government is just able to bail them out. The beneﬁt of
being connected to other banks can be further enhanced by choosing correlated assets,
which gives banks an incentive to herd. We can thus provide an additional explanation
for the herding behavior of banks besides the eﬀect discussed by Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2007). In their paper correlated investments increase the bailout probability of each
bank. Even if we abstract from the fact that correlated investments increase the bailout
probability, we ﬁnd an additional incentive for herding behavior. Hence, the mechanism
described in this paper leads to an overall increase in systemic risk that results from both
interconnectedness as well as herding behavior.
4.4. Transaction costs
In the next step, we analyze whether introducing transaction costs as a disincentive to
create cycle ﬂows on the interbank market impacts our main results. This extension also
enables us to provide a comparative statics analysis of the optimal interbank exposure.
Hence, we assume in the following that the bank must bear the nonpecuniary transaction
cost τ per unit of exchanged interbank deposit and neglect the fact that banks can become
too big to save. Transaction costs include a variety of ﬁxed costs associated with trading
funds, such as brokerage and CHIPS or Fedwire transaction fees or the costs of searching
for banks with matching liquidity needs.
As in our main model, we ﬁrst determine the highest expected repayment banks can
achieve with investment correlations of zero and one, respectively. Then, we analyze
how the optimal amount of interbank exposure changes, given a change in the model
parameters. In a last step, we compare the resulting repayments to determine which of
the two investment possibilities yields a higher return for uninsured creditors.
4.4.1. Positively correlated investments
First, we again consider the situation in which bank investments are perfectly posi-
tively correlated. The possible outcomes of this case are still the same as in our main
model, depicted in Table 1. However, due to the introduction of transaction costs, the
optimization problem of the banks from Eq. (8) changes to
max
K U1 = λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)cR
K
c + K

− τK (25)
The ﬁrst-order condition of the objective function then becomes
∂U1
∂K
= R
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)c2
(c + K)2 − τ = 0
⇒ K1 =
s
R
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)
τ
c − c (26)
18Since the second derivative of the objective function is negative for K1, it is a local
maximum for the interbank exposure.7 Therefore, as long as
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R > τ , (27)
K1 is an interior solution for the maximization problem. If Condition (27) is violated, the
transaction costs are so high that banks receive no beneﬁts from becoming interconnected
in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, the optimal interbank exposure will be equal to zero in this
case. Hence, the optimal amount of interbank exposure Kτ
1 is
K
τ
1 =
(
0 if α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R ≤ τ q
R
α(1−α)(1−λ)
τ c − c if α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R > τ
(28)
From Eq. (28), it can be seen directly that for interior solutions of the interbank exposure,
Kτ
1 is increasing in R, c, as well as α (if α < 0.5) and decreasing in α (if α > 0.5), λ, and
τ. Both R and c increase the amount that governments have to inject in case of a bailout.
For higher values of λ, network insurance becomes less valuable since bailouts are required
less often. Network insurance creates value for uninsured creditors in states in which their
own bank is not bailed out but the other bank is. If α increases, the occurrence of these
states becomes less likely. However, a high α also increases the probability that the other
bank is bailed out given that the creditor’s own bank is not bailed out. For α < 0.5 the
second eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst and vice versa if α > 0.5.
Therefore, in case the bank has to bear transaction costs, the highest expected utility
for the creditor that can be achieved when choosing correlated investments is:
U1 = λcR + (1 − λ)
"
αcR + α(1 − α)cR
Kτ
1
c + Kτ
1
#
− τK
τ
1 (29)
These ﬁndings are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. If banks choose perfectly correlated investments (given a positive bailout
probability and nonpecuniary transaction costs τ), they will choose an interbank exposure
Kτ
1.
Proof The proof follows from the previous discussion. QED
4.4.2. Uncorrelated investments
We now turn to the case in which banks decide to invest in uncorrelated investments.
We again consider the same two scenarios (no contagion and contagion) as in the main
model. The possible outcomes of this case are still the same as in our main model. For
the no-contagion case, the possible outcomes are depicted in Table 2 and those for the
contagion case are depicted in Table 3. After transaction costs are introduced, the overall
7The negative square root can be ruled out, since in this case the interbank exposure would be
negative, which is impossible.
19utility of the uninsured creditors in case the interbank exposure is low enough, such that
the successful bank stays solvent in case one bank is successful and the other is not (i.e.,
K ≤ K∗), becomes
U0(K ≤ K
∗) = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR − τK (30)
From Eq. (30) it follows directly that, for K ≤ K∗, it is always optimal to choose Kτ
0 = 0.
Hence, the highest expected utility for the noninsured creditor in this case is
U0(K ≤ K
∗) = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (31)
If, on the other hand, the interbank exposure is higher than K∗, ﬁnancial contagion will
occur and the overall utility of the uninsured creditors will be:
U0(K > K
∗) =
h
α(1 + λ) + λ
2(1 − 2α) − α
2λ(1 − λ)
i
cR
2
D + λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2R
+ α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR
2
D
K
c + K
− τK (32)
For K > K∗, the ﬁrst-order condition implies
∂U0
∂K
(K > K
∗) = α(1 − λ)(1 − α)R
2
D
c2
(c + K)2 − τ = 0
⇒ K0 =
s
R2
D
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)
τ
c − c (33)
Therefore, as long as the transaction costs are low enough such that
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R
2
D > τ , (34)
choosing a positive amount of interbank exposure is optimal for the banks if K > K∗.
However, if this condition does not hold, the banks will set the interbank exposure equal
to zero. Hence, in case interbank deposits cause transaction costs and Condition (34)
holds, as well as K > K∗, the highest expected utility for the noninsured creditor that
can be achieved is
U0(K > K
∗) =
h
α(1 + λ) + λ
2(1 − 2α) − α
2λ(1 − λ)
i
cR
2
D + λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2R
+ α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR
2
D
K0
c + K0
− τK0 (35)
To determine whether banks will choose a level of interbank exposure that leads to conta-
gion, we now compare the utility of creditors for the diﬀerent levels of interbank deposits
from Eq. (31) and Eq. (35). In the Appendix, we formally show that choosing K0 as the
level of interbank deposits dominates the alternative of no interbank exposure if K0 > K∗
and Condition (34) holds. Otherwise, the banks will choose to have no interbank expo-
sure. Hence, the optimal amount of interbank exposure Kτ
0 for uncorrelated investments
20is
K
τ
0 =
(
0 if α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R2
D ≤ τ or K0 ≤ K∗
q
R2
D
α(1−α)(1−λ)
τ c − c if α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R2
D > τ and K0 > K∗ (36)
Since R2
D is increasing in α, an increase in α raises the amount of capital injected in
case of bailout, which in turn creates an additional beneﬁt from increasing the interbank
exposure. Therefore, K0 is also increasing for a certain interval α > 0.5.
Finally, if Condition (34) holds and K0 > K∗, the highest possible expected utility for
the noninsured creditor when choosing uncorrelated investments is given by Eq. (35). If,
on the other hand, these Conditions do not hold, the highest expected utility is given by
Eq. (31). These ﬁndings can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. If banks choose uncorrelated investments (given a positive bailout prob-
ability and nonpecuniary transaction costs τ), they will choose an interbank exposure of
Kτ
0.
Proof See the Appendix. QED
4.4.3. Comparison of correlated and uncorrelated investments
First, we compare the optimal level of interbank exposure for the diﬀerent investment
strategies. From Eq. (26) and Eq. (33) as well as from the fact that R2
D < R, it follows
directly that Kτ
1 > Kτ
0 in case Condition (27) holds. If this Condition does not hold, the
banks will choose to have no interbank exposure for both investment strategies.
Next, we determine under which investment correlation structure uninsured creditors
receive a higher expected repayment after transaction costs are added to the model. In
the Appendix, we formally prove that U1 > U0 still holds. Hence, our results remain
robust after including transaction costs and banks will always choose investments that
are perfectly correlated. This ﬁnding is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. If banks that are connected via an interbank market have to incur
nonpecuniary transaction costs and there is a nonzero bailout probability, it is optimal
for them to invest in correlated assets. Moreover, they have an incentive to choose an
interbank exposure of Kτ
1.
Proof See the Appendix. QED
Our results are thus robust to the introduction of transaction costs. Therefore, given that
it is optimal for banks to invest in correlated portfolios to maximize their creditors’ repay-
ment, we henceforth restrict our analysis to the case in which banks invest in correlated
investment portfolios.
215. The interbank network and risk shifting
After showing that it is optimal for banks to invest in correlated investments, we now
use this ﬁnding and consider the impact of interbank connections on the incentive of banks
to engage in risk shifting. To model the riskiness of the investment decision, we consider
two assets: a risk-free storage technology that transfers one unit of wealth today into one
unit of wealth tomorrow, and a risky negative NPV investment that generates a return
RN > 1 with probability λN < 1 such that λNRN < 1. As in the previous Section, banks
get c from uninsured creditors and e from equity holders such that c+e = 1. Given that
there is no bailout possibility, the bank can oﬀer creditors either a repayment of c (if it
invests in the safe asset) or cRN
D with probability λN (RN
D ≤ RN) if it invests in the risky
negative NPV asset. The promised repayment RN
D results from the binding participation
constraint of the equity holder. We assume that the outside option of the equity holder
is now given by the risk-free storage technology. Therefore the participation constraint
becomes
E[d1] = e ⇒ λN(RN − cR
N
D) = e ⇒ R
N
D =
λNRN − (1 − c)
cλN
> 1 (37)
Furthermore, since λNRN < 1 it holds that
R
N
D =
λNRN − (1 − c)
cλN
<
1 − (1 − c)
cλN
=
1
λN
⇒ λNR
N
D < 1 (38)
We ﬁrst consider a scenario without a bailout possibility and no interbank network. Here,
it can be easily seen that the expected repayment of the creditors is higher if the bank
invests in the safe asset since c > λNcRN
D. Hence, without the possibility of a bailout,
banks will always choose the safe investment.
Next, we consider the case in which the bank has a positive probability of being
bailed out by the government but still no connections to other banks. Now it can become
proﬁtable to switch to the negative NPV investment if the bailout probability is high
enough. More precisely, a bank will switch to the negative NPV investment if the expected
repayment of creditors for this investment is higher than for the safe repayment c, that
is,
λNcR
N
D + (1 − λN)αcR
N
D > c (39)
Besides the state of nature in which the investment is successful, creditors now also receive
the higher return RN
D when the bank is bailed out by the government. The critical α,
that is, the bailout probability where the bank is indiﬀerent between the two investments
is given by
α
∗ =
1 − λNRN
D
(1 − λN)RN
D
< 1 (40)
Hence, for α > α∗ it is always proﬁtable to switch to the negative NPV investment.
Now we again allow the bank to exchange funds with the bank in the other region.
As before, the banks exchange funds K at t = 0 in return for a payment of KRN
D at
t = 1. Whether banks will switch to the negative NPV investment again depends on
22α. Whenever the expected repayment of the uninsured creditor from investing in the
negative NPV investment opportunity is higher, banks will shift away from the risk-free
investment. Formally, the following condition must be satisﬁed:
λNcR
N
D + (1 − λN)

αcR
N
D + α(1 − α)cR
N
D
K
c + K

> c (41)
Solving this Equation for α yields the critical switching threshold
α
∗∗ =
c + 2K
2K
−
v u u
t(c + 2K)2
4K2 −
(c + K)(RN
DλN − 1)
KRN
D(λN − 1)
(42)
We show in the Appendix that the critical α is strictly smaller if a bank is connected
(i.e., K > 0) to another bank on the interbank market, that is, α∗ > α∗∗. Hence, the
critical threshold α is lower once a bank enters into connections with other banks. Put
diﬀerently, a lower bailout probability is suﬃcient to make the bank switch to the negative
NPV investment. The positive bailout probability can turn a negative NPV investment
into a positive NPV investment from the perspective of the uninsured creditors since they
will receive the high repayment with a higher probability. This eﬀect is reinforced once
the bank is connected to another bank if this other bank has a positive bailout probability
as well. Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. The more interconnected a bank becomes, the lower the critical bailout
probability that makes it proﬁtable for the bank to engage in risk shifting, that is, to switch
to negative NPV investments.
Proof See the appendix. QED
Risk shifting thus becomes more attractive for banks since the downside risk is limited
by two factors. First, the downside risk is limited by the positive bailout probability
because creditors receive their full repayment after the bank is bailed out. Second, the
interbank connection further reduces the downside risk, since it adds an additional state
in which the creditor receives a positive repayment. These two eﬀects turn a negative
NPV investment into a positive NPV investment (from the perspective of the uninsured
creditors).
Taking the results of Sections 4 and 5 together, can help explain why many banks
invested in highly correlated low quality assets in the run-up to the ﬁnancial crisis (e.g.,
subprime loans). Section 4 shows that interbank connections incentivize banks to invest
in highly correlated portfolios because they beneﬁt from defaulting in states in which
the banks they are connected to default as well. This Section additionally shows that,
given that banks prefer correlated investment projects, interbank connections make risk
shifting (i.e., investing in low quality assets rather than safe assets) more attractive (as
long as there is a positive probability that defaulting banks are bailed out). Hence, one
reason for the observed investment behavior prior to the ﬁnancial crisis could be that the
high interconnectedness of large banks incentivized them to invest in highly correlated
low quality assets.
236. Extensions
This Section provides two extensions to our main model. In the ﬁrst part, we extend
our model to a three region economy and discuss diﬀerent network structures. In the
second part, we introduce risk aversion as in Allen and Gale (2000) to demonstrate the
robustness of our results.
6.1. Three region economy
So far we have assumed that the economy consists of only two regions, which gave
banks an incentive to increase the funds exchanged at t = 0, K, up to K1. Now we want
to focus on whether the beneﬁts from taking advantage of the bailout possibility have
an inﬂuence on the interbank network size and structure. In particular, we analyze the
change in the expected utility of the creditors after an additional bank is added to the
interbank network. Furthermore, we analyze whether the creditors derive a higher utility
if the network is directed or bidirected (see Fig. 4).
directed network
A B
B B C B
A B
B B C B
bidirected network
Figure 4: Interbank network structures
Afterwards we investigate how the desired network structure changes if we relax the
assumption that the governments in each region (country) can provide exactly the same
amount of bailout funds. To derive these results, we extend our model to a three region
economy (A, B, and C) and start the analysis by checking whether the additional region
improves the expected repayment of the uninsured creditors. First, we examine a directed
interbank network. In this case, banks deposit funds K in a neighboring region and receive
funds from another neighboring region in return for a payment of KRD at t = 1. Since
the model is still symmetric, the expected utility of all uninsured creditors is the same.
Hence, it is suﬃcient to consider only one speciﬁc bank and its creditor. In this setup,
the expected repayment (UDI) of the uninsured creditors in t = 1 becomes
UDI = λcRD + (1 − λ)
h
αcRD + (1 − α)αcRD
K
c+K + (1 − α)2αcRD
K2
(c+K)2
i
(43)
To fully capture the respective repayments in the diﬀerent default states, consider the view
of a creditor of bank BA. If bank BA is bailed out, the creditor receives the full repayment.
If bank BA is not bailed out, the repayment of the creditor depends on what happens to
the other banks. If bank BB is bailed out, the creditor receives a fraction K/(c+K) of his
promised repayment. If bank BB is not rescued but bank BC is, then the creditor receives
24a fraction K2/(c + K)2. Due to the perfect correlation of the banks’ investments, the
binding participation constraint of the equity holders is again Constraint (6), implying
that RD = R. We maintain the assumption of perfect competition, implying that banks
must still maximize the expected repayment of their creditors. Hence, the maximization
problem for a speciﬁc bank becomes
max
K UDI = λcR + (1 − λ)
h
αcR + (1 − α)αcR K
c+K + (1 − α)2αcR K2
(c+K)2
i
(44)
Again, we split the amount of interbank deposits into two intervals. In the interval
K ∈ [0,K1] the government will be able to bail out the bank and repay all liabilities.
Hence, for this interval, α = αB and the derivative of the objective function becomes
∂UDI
∂K
= (1 − λ)(1 − αB)αBcR
"
c
(c + K)2 + (1 − αB)
2cK
(c + K)3
#
> 0 (45)
Thus, increasing K again enhances the expected utility of the creditor in this interval. If,
on the other hand, banks increase their exposure even more, that is, K ∈ (K1,∞], the
bailout probability α drops to zero. Hence, the expected repayment to CA drops again
to λcR. Thus, in the three region case with a directed interbank network, the expected
utility of the uninsured creditors is increasing in K as well, as long as R(c + K) < L.
Therefore, banks will choose the same amount of interbank deposits K = K1 as in the
two region case and the highest expected utility that can be achieved is
UDI = λcR + (1 − λ)


αBcR + (1 − αB)αBcR K1
c+K1
+(1 − αB)2αBcR K1
2
(c+K1)2

 (46)
= λcR + (1 − λ)


αBcR + (1 − αB)αBL cK1
(c+K1)2
+(1 − αB)2αBL cK1
2
(c+K1)3

 (47)
Comparing the maximal expected utility of the creditor in a three bank interbank market
(see Eq. (47)) with the two bank case, in which the bank in region A is only connected
to one other region (see Eq. (11)), one can easily see that the expected utility increases
if the bank is connected to more banks. Since in the three region case each bank is now
linked to two other banks (instead of only one other bank) the expected repayment of the
uninsured creditors increases. Moreover, the repayment of creditors is again increasing
in the interbank exposure K. Therefore, banks will prefer to be connected to two banks
instead of only one.
We now consider a bidirected interbank network structure, that is, a structure where
each bank has bilateral exposure to all other banks. Since the model is still symmetric, we
again restrict our analysis to bank BA and its creditor. Table 4 summarizes the possible
states for this network structure. If the investments are successful, all banks are able to
settle their liabilities and no default occurs (S1). Hence, the uninsured creditor receives
cRD and the investor receives a dividend R−RD. If the investment fails, the repayment to
the uninsured creditors depends on whether the banks are bailed out or not. Several cases
25must be considered here. If BA is bailed out by the government (states S2 to S4 and state
S6), creditor CA receives the full repayment. If, however, only one or both of the other
banks (BB and BC) are rescued, the creditor of bank BA will receive only a fraction of the
contractually speciﬁed repayment. In case both other banks are bailed out, each receives
an amount (c + 2K)RD from its respective government. Therefore, they are able to fully
repay their creditors and settle their interbank claims. Hence, bank BA receives KRD
from BB and BC, respectively, that is, 2KRD in total. Since the bank’s total liabilities
are (c+2K)RD > 2KRD, it must split these funds on a pro rata basis among its creditors.
Consequently, the uninsured creditor of bank BA who holds a fraction c/(c + 2K) of the
total liabilities receives a total payment of cRD 2K/(c + 2K). The remaining funds are
paid back to the other banks.
ρ = 1 Prob. L BA BB BC CA IA
S1 λ S N N N cRD R − cRD
S2 (1 − λ)α3 F B B B cRD 0
S3 (1 − λ)(1 − α)α2 F B B N cRD 0
S4 (1 − λ)(1 − α)α2 F B N B cRD 0
S5 (1 − λ)(1 − α)α2 F N B B cRD
2K
c+2K 0
S6 (1 − λ)(1 − α)2α F B N N cRD 0
S7 (1 − λ)(1 − α)2α F N B N cRD
K
c+K 0
S8 (1 − λ)(1 − α)2α F N N B cRD
K
c+K 0
S9 (1 − λ)(1 − α)3 F N N N 0 0
Table 4: Capital ﬂows in a bidirected connected interbank network
We now discuss the states in which only one bank receives funds from its government,
that is, states S7 and S8. The symmetry of our model framework allows us to focus
on state S7, since the cash ﬂows in S8 can be derived analogously. To derive the exact
repayment the uninsured creditor of bank BA receives, we proceed in several steps. First,
we determine the total amount of funds channeled through bank BA during the repayment
process. Since bank BA is in default and funds are again split on a pro rata basis, the
uninsured creditor receives a fraction of c/(c+2K) of every unit of capital that arrives at
bank BA. The solution strategy is thus as follows: We start by tracking all funds injected
into the ﬁnancial system by the governments and follow these funds until they arrive at
bank BA for the ﬁrst time. In a next step, we examine the funds that are paid back into
the ﬁnancial system and arrive again at bank BA.
Next, we return to a detailed description of state S7. In state S7 only bank BB
is bailed out and thus receives funds of (c + 2K)RD, which is suﬃcient to settle all
liabilities, implying that banks BA and BC both receive KRD. A fraction K/(c + 2K)
of these funds KRD that bank BC receives are passed on to bank BA. Hence, bank BA
receives an amount KRD(1 + K/(c + 2K)) in the ﬁrst round. As described above, a
fraction c/(c + 2K) is directly paid to the uninsured creditor, whereas each of the other
banks receives a fraction K/(c + 2K). However, a fraction of the funds that go to bank
BC ﬂows back to bank BA, which implies that a fraction K2/(c+2K)2 is returned to bank
BA after the next cycle ﬂow. After these funds arrive at bank BA, the same ﬂows occur
again, which yields a capital ﬂow to creditor CA, that can be expressed as a geometric
26series:
KRD

1 +
K
c + 2K
 ∞ X
i=0
 K
c + 2K
2i c
c + 2K
= KRD

1 +
K
c + 2K
 c
c + 2K
= cRD
K
c + K
(48)
As already discussed, state S8 can be described analogously, implying that the creditor of
bank BA receives the same repayment in this state. Therefore, the expected repayment
(UBI) of the uninsured creditors in t = 1 can be written as
UBI = λcRD + (1 − λ)

αcRD + (1 − α)α
2cRD
2K
c + 2K
+ 2(1 − α)
2αcRD
K
c + K

(49)
Again, the participation constraint of the investors implies that RD = R. Due to the fact
that UBI is increasing in K until the total liabilities of the bank are equal to L, the banks
will again choose K = KBI, where
(c + 2KBI)RD = L ⇒ KBI =
L
2RD
−
1
2
c (50)
Hence, the maximal expected utility for the uninsured creditor in a bidirected interbank
market is
UBI = λcR + (1 − λ)
"
αBcR + (1 − αB)α
2
BcR
2KBI
c + 2KBI
+ 2(1 − αB)
2αBcR
KBI
cKBI
#
(51)
Now we can compare the highest possible expected utility for creditors in a directed versus
a bidirected interbank network. Comparing Eq. (46) and Eq. (51) shows that banks can
maximize the expected repayment of their noninsured creditors by trying to establish
large directed cycle ﬂows within the interbank market instead of just creating bilateral
exposure with other banks. This result can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. If all governments can spend equally high amounts for a bailout pro-
gram, banks in a three region economy are incentivized to create large directed cycle ﬂows
instead of bilateral exposures.
Proof See the Appendix. QED
This result also makes sense intuitively. To make as much use as possible of the bailout
possibility, banks prefer being part of a long cycle ﬂow instead of lending money only
bilaterally. Thereby, they can beneﬁt to a larger extent from the bailout of any of the
banks that are part of the cycle. However, this mechanism only works if a bank can be
sure that the other banks will continue to create this large cycle and not start to exchange
funds bilaterally.
In a next step, we relax the assumption that the governments in the respective regions
can provide the same amount of bailout funds and show how this inﬂuences the utility
27maximizing network structure. Therefore, we assume from now on that there is a diﬀerent
critical threshold L for each government (due to diﬀerent country sizes) where banks
become too big to save and therefore the bailout probability decreases to zero. Without
loss of generality, we assume that country A can provide more bailout funds than country
B, which in turn can provide more than country C. Hence, in the following we assume
that LA > LB > LC.
In the beginning of this Section, we show that the expected repayment of the uninsured
creditor is maximized if banks establish a directed interbank network. However, here a
directed interbank network is only utility enhancing until bank BC’s liabilities reach LC,
which happens at an interbank exposure of KC where KC = LC/(2R)−1/2c. Exceeding
this threshold would reduce the bailout probability of bank BC to zero. Hence, if BC’s
balance sheet exceeds LC, the expected utility for creditor CC becomes
U
C
DI(K > K
C) = λcR + (1 − λ)
"
(1 − α)αcR
K
c + K
+ (1 − α)
2αcR
K2
(c + K)2
#
(52)
Note that this is only true as long as the other two banks are still not too big to save.
One can see directly from Eq. (52) that the expected repayment of CC is smaller for
K > KC than for an interbank exposure of K = KC. Therefore, bank BC does not
have an incentive to accept additional funds from other banks as soon as it reaches an
interbank exposure of KC. However, at this point banks BA and BB would still be able
to increase their interbank exposure to a certain extent without immediately becoming
too big to save. Since BC is not willing to borrow any additional funds on the interbank
market, the only option to increase the interbank exposure of BA and BB is to lend and
borrow bilaterally.
Since an additional bilateral interbank exposure between BA and BB does not alter
the cash ﬂows that are induced by the directed interbank network created by banks BA,
BB, and BC, we can consider the bilateral exposure between BA and BB in isolation.
This added value of bilateral exposure was already discussed in Section 4. Therefore,
we can conclude that banks BA and BB lend to and borrow from each other until bank
BB becomes too big to save as well. Hence, if governments diﬀer in their ability to
bail out banks, banks have an incentive to ﬁrst establish a connected directed interbank
network that includes all banks. As soon as some banks become too big to save they stop
their borrowing and lending activities on the interbank market. The remaining banks
(which are not yet too big to save) then continue to increase their interbank exposure by
establishing directed capital ﬂows between each other. This behavior leads to an interbank
network of very high density where the degree centrality of banks is increasing in their
size, that is, bigger banks are more connected than smaller banks. Furthermore, our
model predicts that larger banks tend to be established in countries with higher bailout
possibilities.
Proposition 6.2. If governments diﬀer in their ability to bail out banks, the density of
the interbank network will become very high and the degree centrality of banks will increase
in their balance sheet size. Furthermore, large banks will be mainly established in countries
with higher bailout possibilities.
286.2. Risk averse creditors
From now on we allow uninsured creditors to be risk averse (in line with the literature
on interbank networks and ﬁnancial contagion, e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000; Brusco and
Castiglionesi, 2007). Here, the interbank market not only is present for the reasons
discussed in the previous Sections, but also allows banks to coinsure against regional
liquidity shocks as in Allen and Gale (2000). We show that even if the interbank market
has a diﬀerent reason to exist, our main mechanism is still present. Speciﬁcally, we show
that banks have an incentive to increase their interbank exposure beyond the level that
would be suﬃcient to perfectly coinsure against liquidity shocks. Our economy in this
Section now consists of three dates t = 0,1,2 and, again, two regions A and B, each with a
continuum of identical banks that all adopt the same behavior and can thus be described
by a representative bank (protected by limited liability). Furthermore, there are now n
ex ante identical uninsured creditors and again one risk-neutral investor. Creditors have
Diamond-Dybvig (1983) preferences, that is,
U(c1,c2) =
(
u(c1) with probability ωi (early creditors)
u(c2) with probability 1 − ωi (late creditors) (53)
where i ∈ {A,B} and the utility function u(·) is deﬁned for nonnegative numbers, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes Inada con-
ditions. Each creditor is endowed with one unit of capital at t = 0. Of the n creditors in
each region there are ni
e early creditors and ni
l late creditors. Thus, ωi ≡ ni
e/n represents
the fraction of early creditors, where ωi can be either high or low (ωH > ωL). There are
two equally likely states S1 and S2. At t = 1 state-dependent liquidity preferences are
revealed (see Table 5).
Each region has the same ex ante probability of facing a high liquidity shock. A
creditor’s type is private information and the proportion of early creditors in the whole
economy is given by γ = (ωH + ωL)/2. Thus, there is no aggregate uncertainty. At t = 1
all liquidity-related uncertainty is resolved and creditors learn their type.
There are two types of investment opportunities: a risk-free, liquid type and a risky,
illiquid one (generating only a return of r < 1 if liquidated at t = 1). The risk-free asset is
a storage technology that transfers one unit of capital at a certain period into one unit of
capital in the following period. The illiquid asset is only available at t = 0 and generates
a return of either R > 1 with probability λ or zero with probability (1 − λ) at t = 2
for each unit of capital invested. We assume that the illiquid asset has a positive NPV,
that is, λR > 1, and that investment outcomes are perfectly positively correlated across
regions.
A B
S1 ωH ωL
S2 ωL ωH
Table 5: Liquidity shocks
Since our model now has three dates, the equity investors are entitled to receive
29dividends at t = 1 and t = 2. Hence, the investor’s utility is now
u(d0,d1,d2) = λRd0 + d1 + d2 (54)
As before, since investors can obtain a utility of λRe by immediately consuming the initial
endowment, they must earn an expected return of at least λR on their invested money to
give up consumption at t = 0. Hence, the participation constraint for investors becomes
E[d1 + d2] ≥ e0λR (55)
6.2.1. Central planner economy
In this economy the Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be characterized as the solution to
the problem of a planner maximizing the creditors’ expected utility. By pooling resources
the planner can overcome the problem of the regions’ asymmetric liquidity needs. Let y
and x denote the per capita amounts invested in the risk-free and risky assets, respectively.
Furthermore, let c and cRD denote the amounts creditors can withdraw to satisfy their
liquidity needs at t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. In this context, RD can be understood as
the interest rate creditors earn by not withdrawing their funds for an additional period.
The planner’s problem can then be written as
max
x,y,c,RD
U = γu(c) + (1 − γ)λu(cRD) (56)
subject to
x + y ≤ n, γ 2nc ≤ 2y, (1 − γ)2ncRD ≤ 2xR, (57)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, RD ≥ 0. (58)
The ﬁrst set of constraints represents budget constraints for periods 0, 1 and 2. Since
optimality requires that the constraints be binding, the optimization problem can be
rewritten as
max
y γu
 
y
γn
!
+ (1 − γ) λu
 
R(n − y)
(1 − γ)n
!
(59)
Given the utility function’s properties this optimization problem has a unique interior
solution. The optimal value y∗ ∈ (0,1) can be obtained from the ﬁrst-order condition
u
0
 
y∗
γn
!
= λRu
0
 
R(n − y∗)
(1 − γ)n
!
(60)
Once y∗ has been determined, we can use the remaining constraints to determine the
optimal values of the other variables. Hence, we obtain
c
∗ =
y∗
γn
, R
∗
D =
R(n − y∗)
(1 − γ)nc∗, and x
∗ = n − y
∗ (61)
30Since λR > 1, we can conclude that u0(c) > u0(cRD) and hence RD > 1, implying that
consumption is higher at t = 2 than at t = 1. Consequently, late creditors have no incen-
tive to mimic early creditors. We denote the ﬁrst-best allocation as δ∗ = (y∗,x∗,c∗,R∗
D).
6.2.2. Decentralized economy with an interbank market and no bailout possibility
Allen and Gale (2000) show that this ﬁrst-best allocation can be achieved by allowing
banks in a decentralized economy to coinsure against liquidity shocks. Coinsurance is
possible since the liquidity needs of the two regions are negatively correlated. In contrast
to Allen and Gale (2000), we again allow banks to exchange an arbitrary amount of
deposits K at t = 0, and not only the amount necessary to achieve ﬁrst-best. However,
we show that exchanging funds above the level of the ﬁrst best solution does not increase
the utility of uninsured creditors if there is no bailout possibility. Let k denote the amount
of interbank deposits that is withdrawn by the bank that faces a high liquidity shock at
t = 1.
0 t 
A B K
1 t  2 t 
A B A B B B B B B B k () D K k R 
D KR
Figure 5: Capital ﬂows in the two region economy
The capital ﬂows are depicted in Fig. 5. At t = 0 the two banks exchange deposits K.
At t = 1 the bank with the high liquidity shock (BA in Fig. 5) withdraws an amount k
from the other bank to satisfy the liquidity needs of its creditors. In the ﬁnal period bank
BA receives its remaining deposits (K−k) from bank BB and pays back the deposits that
bank BB deposited in bank BA. Additionally, both banks earn a rate of return RD on
these remaining deposits. Furthermore, we assume that contracts again take the form of a
standard debt contract, that is, they cannot be made contingent on either the realization
of the risky asset or the realization of the state of nature. Hence, each bank can oﬀer a
contract δ = (y,x,c,RD,K) to its creditors and the bank in the other region. Now RD
additionally represents the gross return paid on interbank deposits held from t = 1 until
t = 2. With perfect competition in the banking sector, the banks will oﬀer their creditors
a contract that replicates the ﬁrst-best outcome. The optimization problem of a bank can
then be written as
max
x,y,c,RD,K,k
U =
1
2
[ωHu(c) + (1 − ωH)λu(cRD)] +
1
2
[ωLu(c) + (1 − ωL)λu(cRD)] (62)
subject to
ωHnc + d1 ≤ y + k (63)
ωLnc + d1 + k ≤ y (64)
31(1 − ωH)ncRD + d2 + KRD ≤ Rx + (K − k)RD (65)
(1 − ωL)ncRD + d2 + (K − k)RD ≤ Rx + KRD (66)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, RD ≥ 0, x + y ≤ 1 + e0, E[d1 + d2] ≥ λRe0, k ≤ K (67)
Constraints (63) and (64) represent budget constraints at t = 1 and Constraints (65) and
(66) represent budget constraints at t = 2. As shown by Allen and Gale (2000), optimality
requires that k∗ = (ωH − γ)cn. As long as there is no positive bailout probability, the
actual amount of funds exchanged, K, does not alter the utility of the creditors as long
as K ≥ k∗. These ﬁndings lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3. If there is no possibility for banks to be bailed out and the two repre-
sentative banks exchange an amount K of deposits, then the ﬁrst-best allocation δ∗ can be
implemented by a decentralized banking system oﬀering standard deposit contracts. More-
over, banks have no incentive to exchange more funds than required to achieve ﬁrst-best,
that is, they will only exchange K = k∗ = (ωH − γ)cn.
Proof For the proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition, we refer to the proof of Proposition
3 of Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). To see why the second part is true, that is, why banks
do not exchange more than necessary to achieve ﬁrst-best, note that optimality again
requires the constraints to be binding. Then the amount of funds actually exchanged, K,
drops out of the optimization problem. Hence, the amount that is actually exchanged does
not inﬂuence the utility of the creditors. Therefore, banks have no incentive to exchange
more funds than necessary to achieve ﬁrst-best, which implies that K = k∗ = (ωH −γ)cn.
QED
This result reconﬁrms the ﬁndings of the previous studies by Allen and Gale (2000) and
Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007).
6.2.3. Decentralized economy with an interbank market and positive bailout probability
So far we have assumed that after a bank failure occurs, creditors receive no repayment
at t = 2. Now we investigate how the results change if there is the possibility that a bank
will be bailed out by the government after a default. As before, we assume a bailout
happens with probability α. Therefore, the optimization problem becomes
max
x,y,c,RD,K,k
U =
1
2


ωHu(c) + (1 − ωH)



λu(cRD) + (1 − λ)[(1 − α)2u(0)
+α(1 − α)u(cRD)
+α(1 − α)u(cRDθ1) + α2u(cRD)]






+
1
2


ωLu(c) + (1 − ωL)



λu(cRD) + (1 − λ)[(1 − α)2u(0)
+α(1 − α)u(cRD)
+α(1 − α)u(cRDθ2) + α2u(cRD)]





 (68)
32with
θ1 =
K − k
(1 − ωH)nc + K
and θ2 =
K
(1 − ωL)nc + (K − k)
subject to
ωHnc + d1 ≤ y + k (69)
ωLnc + d1 + k ≤ y (70)
(1 − ωH)ncRD + d2 + KRD ≤ Rx + (K − k)RD (71)
(1 − ωL)ncRD + d2 + (K − k)RD ≤ Rx + KRD (72)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, RD ≥ 0; x + y ≤ 1 + e0; E[d1 + d2] ≥ λRe0; k ≤ K (73)
Eq. (68) is the objective function of the optimization problem of the representative bank
in region i. The bank in region i is equally likely to face a high or a low liquidity shock.
If a high liquidity shock occurs in, for example, region A, a fraction ωH of the creditors
will withdraw their funds at t = 1 and the remaining creditors will demand repayment in
t = 2. At t = 2 several cases must be considered. The risky asset yields a positive return
R with probability λ and creditors receive their promised repayment cRD. If the risky
asset yields a zero payoﬀ, the return of the creditor depends on whether the banks are
bailed out or not. If neither of the two banks is bailed out, creditors receive no payment.
If the bank in region A is bailed out, the government steps in and creditors receive their
full repayment cRD. If only the bank in region B is bailed out, bank BA receives the
funds still owed to it by BB (see Fig. 5). Since BA has already withdrawn an amount k
at t = 1, it receives the remaining funds (K −k)RD. Since BA has two creditors, namely,
its uninsured creditor and bank BB, funds are again split on a pro rata basis. Hence,
creditors receive a fraction θ1 of their promised repayment. Finally, if both banks are
bailed out, then creditors again receive the full amount. The second case (where BA faces
a low liquidity shock) can be described analogously.
All constraints are as in the previous Section. By examining the optimization problem,
it becomes obvious that the amount of funds exchanged, K, now has an inﬂuence on the
utility of the creditors. Although K again drops out of the constraints (optimality again
requires the constraints to be binding), it now also enters the objective function directly
because it determines the amount that creditors receive in the case of a default if only
one bank is bailed out. Before the repayment in this state of nature was zero.
Again, optimality requires that banks choose ﬁrst-best, that is, k∗ = (ωH − γ)cn.
Note, however, that the optimal consumption of creditors changes. Compared to the case
without bailout, creditors now consume less at t = 1 and increase their consumption
t = 2 (we formally prove this result in the Appendix). Hence, the optimal amount of
funds withdrawn at t = 1 is now smaller than in the situation without bailout. Therefore,
33we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for K:
∂U
∂K
=
1
2
(1 − ωH)(1 − λ)α(1 − α)c2nRD
(1 − γ)
(K + cn(1 − ωH))2u0

cRD
K − cn(ωH − γ)
K + cn(1 − ωH)

+
1
2
(1 − ωL)(1 − λ)α(1 − α)c2nRD
(1 − γ)
(K + cn(1 − γ))2u0

cRD
K
K + cn(1 − γ)

> 0 (74)
As we can see from the ﬁrst-order condition, the utility of the creditor is now increasing
in K (i.e., the funds exchanged at t = 0), since K increases the amount that the creditor
receives in case of default of the risky asset (although the amount needed to satisfy
the consumption needs of creditors is now actually smaller, banks have an incentive to
increase their interbank exposure). Therefore, banks have an incentive to increase the
amount of interbank deposits and hence their connectivity to a level that exceeds the
ﬁrst-best solution derived before.
Proposition 6.4. Given a positive bailout probability, banks have an incentive to increase
their interbank exposure beyond the ﬁrst-best level.
Proof First note that the constraints are the same as in the previous Section, where
we excluded the possibility of a bailout. Again, optimality requires that the constraints
be binding, which implies that K drops out of the constraints. Hence, we only have to
examine the objective function. The results follow from the positive derivative of the
creditors’ utility function with respect to K. QED
Hence, even if the interbank market does not exist only as an insurance for noninsured
creditors but also to coinsure against regional liquidity shocks, as in Allen and Gale (2000),
the main mechanism is still present. Therefore, banks are still incentivized to increase
their interbank exposure as long as they are not too big to save (given that there is a
positive bailout probability).
7. Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the puzzle why banks have an incentive to be highly in-
terconnected on the interbank market and why it can be rational to engage in circular
lending activities, although this behavior considerably increases systemic risk and leverage
without altering the aggregate relation with the real economy. We show that banks create
these cyclical liabilities because it enables them to make use of the implicit government
bailout guarantees. Such guarantees shift the probability distribution of the returns of
risky investments and thereby increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors.
Furthermore, the mechanism we derive in this paper is able to explain why banks choose
correlated investments. Hence, the presented mechanism leads to an overall increase
in systemic risk that results from both interconnectedness as well as herding behavior.
Moreover, we show that interconnectedness incentivizes banks to engage in risk shifting.
Therefore, our model helps explain why banks invested in risky correlated investments
34(e.g., US subprime loans) in the run-up to the ﬁnancial crisis. Finally, we show that the
optimal network structure depends on the amount of funds that is available to bail out
banks in diﬀerent countries. Our results continue to hold even if we allow creditors to be
risk averse.
Several policy implications can be derived from our results. Generally, each of these
policy implications aims at reducing the banks’ incentive to create high interbank expo-
sures by entering into cyclical liabilities. One of the key topics in the current discussion
in the European Union is the introduction of a ﬁnancial transaction tax to limit specu-
lative trading activities. Since interconnectedness can not only be created via interbank
loans, but also by using derivatives like for example CDS, such a tax could be a potential
mechanism to reduce the high interconnectedness and therefore mitigate the systemic risk
problems that result from investing in highly correlated low-quality assets. Similarly, one
can think about increasing the risk weights for interbank loans under the Basel accord and
thereby increase the amount of equity necessary to satisfy minimum capital requirements.
Currently banks do not have to hold high amounts of capital for most of their interbank
exposure. If interbank loans get a higher risk weight, banks are incentivized to reduce
their circular lending activities and hence reduce systemic risk in the interbank market.
However, banks could potentially counter this regulatory measure by creating equity cycle
ﬂows in addition to cyclical debt liabilities. By investing equity in a cyclical way, banks
can reach any desired equity ratio without being dependent on outside investors. A third
possibility to mitigate the incentives to create large cycle ﬂows would be the introduction
of the widely discussed bank levy. Charging banks with large balance sheets (that can
very well result from high amounts of cyclical liabilities) higher taxes for their systemic
risk can potentially mitigate the incentive to create these large cycle ﬂows in the ﬁrst
place.
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A.1. Switching point K∗ in Section 4.2
Here, we will formally derive the critical threshold of interbank deposits K∗ that just
allows a successful bank to stay solvent if the bank it is connected to defaults and is
not bailed out. The critical cases to derive this threshold are those in which only one
investment fails and neither of the banks is bailed out, i.e., S8 and S11. Here, the bank
with the successful investment will pay the following amount to the bank with the failed
investment:
min
(
KRD,R
K(c + K)
c2 + 2cK
)
(75)
The ﬁrst term represents the amount the successful bank owes to the failed bank and the
second term results from:
∞ X
i=0
R
 K
c + K
(1+2i)
= R
K
c + K
1
1 − K2
(c+K)2
= R
K(c + K)
c2 + 2cK
(76)
Hence, the failing bank receives either its full repayment (if there are enough funds avail-
able to settle all claims), i.e., KRD ≤ R K(c + K)/(c2 + 2cK) or receives a payment of
R K(c + K)/(c2 + 2cK). The critical threshold up to which the bank receives its full
repayment can be written as:
K
∗
1RD = R
K∗
1(c + K∗
1)
c2 + 2cK∗
1
⇒ K
∗
1 =
c(R − cRD)
2cRD − R
(77)
From Eq. (77) we can see that the successful bank can always pay back its liabilities
to the unsuccessful bank as long as R > 2cRD. Thus, it will never default in this case.
In what follows we will focus on the more interesting case in which a default is possible
depending on the level of K. Hence, from now on we will assume that R < 2cRD. We
next consider the repayment the uninsured creditor gets from the successful bank, which
is given by:
min
(
cRD,R
(c + K)
c + 2K
)
(78)
The ﬁrst term is the total amount owed to the uninsured creditor and the second term
comes from:
∞ X
i=0
R
c
c + K
 K
c + K
2i
= R
c
c + K
1
1 − K2
(c+K)2
= R
(c + K)
c + 2K
(79)
Hence, as long as K is small enough such that cRD ≤ R (c + K)/(c + 2K) the successful
bank can fully repay its uninsured creditor. However if K exceeds a critical threshold,
the bank is unable to settle all its claims and can only repay R (c + K)/(c + 2K) to its
36creditor. The critical switching point is given by:
cRD = R
(c + K∗
2)
c + 2K∗
2
⇒ K
∗
2 =
c(R − cRD)
2cRD − R
(80)
As can be seen from Eq. (77) and Eq. (80), the thresholds K∗
1 and K∗
2 are the same. We
now turn to the repayment of the uninsured creditor of the failed bank, which is given
by:
min

cRD,KRD
c
c + K
,R
K
c + 2K

= min

cRD
K
c + K
,R
K
c + 2K

(81)
where the ﬁrst term is again the total amount owed to the uninsured creditor, the second
term is the maximal payment from the bank with the successful investment to the bank
with the failed investment times the fraction the insured creditor gets from this payment,
and the last term comes from:
∞ X
i=0
R
c
c + K
 K
c + K
(1+2i)
= R
cK
(c + K)2
1
1 − K2
(c+K)2
= R
K
c + 2K
(82)
One can immediately see that the unsuccessful bank can never fully repay its uninsured
creditors. Furthermore, as long as K is small enough such that
cRD
K
c + K
≤ R
K
c + 2K
, (83)
the payment of the unsuccessful bank to its uninsured creditors is cRD K/(c + K). If K
is too high, the payment is R K/(c + 2K). The critical switching threshold is given by
cRD
K∗
3
c + K∗
3
≤ R
K∗
3
c + 2K∗
3
⇒ K
∗
3 =
c(R − cRD)
2cRD − R
(84)
Hence, all three thresholds are the same, which is why we will denote them in the following
by
K
∗ ≡ K
∗
1 = K
∗
2 = K
∗
3. (85)
Therefore, if a speciﬁc bank has a successful investment, it is able to settle all its liabilities,
even if the other bank fails, as long as its interbank exposure is K ≤ K∗. This completes
the derivation of K∗.
A.2. Proof of Corollary 4.2
We now check whether the expected utility for the uninsured creditor is maximized
by choosing K ≤ K∗ or by choosing K > K∗. For the interval K ∈ [0,K∗] we know that
U0(K ≤ K
∗) = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (86)
Therefore, the expected utility of noninsured creditors does not depend on the interbank
exposure K, which makes the bank indiﬀerent with regard to the choice of K. For the
37interval K ∈ [K∗,K0] with K0 = L/R2
D − c we know that:
U0(K = K
∗) = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (87)
∂U0
∂K
(K
∗ ≤ K ≤ K0) = α(1 − λ)(1 − α)R
2
D
c2
(c + K)2 > 0 (88)
Hence, if (c+K∗)R1
D < L, the bank will increase the interbank exposure K until K = K0.
As soon as this threshold is hit, the bailout probability α drops to zero and the expected
utility for the uninsured creditors decreases to λ2cR2
D + λ(1 − λ)R. If, on the other
hand, (c+K∗)R1
D ≥ L, the bank will be indiﬀerent about the choice of K in the interval
K = [0,K0]. Therefore, if (c + K∗)R1
D < L, the bank chooses K = K0 to maximize the
expected utility of its uninsured creditor:
U0 =
h
α(1 + λ) + λ
2(1 − 2α) − α
2λ(1 − λ)
i
cR
2
D
+ λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)
2R + α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR
2
D
K0
c + K0
(89)
In case (c + K∗)R1
D ≥ L, the maximal expected utility of its uninsured creditor becomes
U0 = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (90)
This completes the derivation of the expected utility of uninsured creditors in the case of
a correlation of zero and the proof of Corollary 4.2.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.3
To determine whether banks prefer correlated investments, we compare the utility
of the uninsured creditors for both types of investment correlations (i.e., a correlation
of one and zero) and for the latter case the situations in which (c + K∗)R1
D < L and
(c + K∗)R1
D ≥ L. First, we consider the case that (c + K∗)R1
D < L:
U1 > U0
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)L
cK1
(c + K1)2

>
" 
α(1 + λ) + λ2(1 − 2α) − α2λ(1 − λ)

cR2
D
+λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)2R + α(1 − λ)(1 − α)L cK0
(c+K0)2
#
(91)
After inserting the expression in Eq. (13) for R2
D, we can simplify the right hand side and
the inequality becomes:
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)L
cK1
(c + K1)2

>



α + λ(1 − α)c −
α(1−c)
α+λ(1−α)

R
+α(1 − λ)(1 − α)L cK0
(c+K0)2


α(1 − λ)(1 − α)

R
(1 − c)
α + λ(1 − α)
+ L
cK1
(c + K1)2

> α(1 − λ)(1 − α)L
cK0
(c + K0)2
R
1 − c
α + λ(1 − α)
+ L
cK1
(c + K1)2 > L
cK0
(c + K0)2 (92)
38Since the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is positive and cK/(c+K)2 is decreasing in K as
well as K0 > K1, it follows that U1 > U0. Next, we consider the case that (c+K∗)R1
D ≥ L:
U1 > U0
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)L
cK1
(c + K1)2

> [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)L
cK1
(c + K1)2 > 0 (93)
Hence, U1 is always larger than U0, irrespective of whether (c + K∗)R1
D < L or (c +
K∗)R1
D ≥ L. Therefore, the bank always chooses ρ = 1. This completes the proof.
A.4. Comparison of injected government bailout funds in Section 4.3
We now compare the expected net injected government bailout funds in the correlated
and uncorrelated (with contagion) case. In the uncorrelated case the governments inject
funds in states S2, S3, S4, S6, S7, S9, and S10 (Table 3), whereas in the correlated case
the governments inject cash in states S2, S3, and S4 (Table 1). The total expected net
bailout funds are higher in the correlated investment case if Inequality (94) holds.
"
(1 − λ)α22cR
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
cR K1
c+K1 + cR
i
#
>

 

(1 − λ)2α2cR2
D + 2λ(1 − λ)αcR2
D
+2(1 − λ)2(1 − α)α
h
cR2
D
K0
c+K0 + cR2
D
i
+2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
cR2
D
K0
c+K0 + cR2
D − R
i

 

(94)
This inequality can be simpliﬁed to
"
2(1 − λ)α2cR
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
cR K1
c+K1 + cR
i
#
>



(1 − λ)2α2cR2
D + 2λ(1 − λ)αcR2
D
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
cR2
D
K0
c+K0 + cR2
D
i
−2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)αR



"
2(1 − λ)α2cR + 2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)αR
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
cR K1
c+K1 + cR
i
#
>
"
(1 − λ)2α2cR2
D + 2λ(1 − λ)αcR2
D
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
cR2
D
K0
c+K0 + cR2
D
i
#
"
2(1 − λ)α2cR + 2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)αR
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
L cK1
(c+K1)2 + cR
i
#
>
"
(1 − λ)2α2cR2
D + 2λ(1 − λ)αcR2
D
+2(1 − λ)(1 − α)α
h
L cK0
(c+K0)2 + cR2
D
i
#
(95)
Note that the second row on the left hand side in Inequality (95) is higher than the second
row on the right hand side (see proof of Proposition 4.3). Thus, what remains to be shown
to prove Inequality (94) is that the ﬁrst row on the left hand side is larger than the ﬁrst
row on the right hand side. Since R > R2
D and c < 1 it holds that

2(1 − λ)α2cR
+2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)αR

>

2(1 − λ)α2cR2
D
+2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)αcR2
D

(96)
In the last step, we show that the right hand side of Inequality (96) is larger than the
ﬁrst row of the right hand side in Inequality (95), which proves that the ﬁrst row of the
left hand side in Inequality (95) is larger than the one on the right hand side

2(1 − λ)α2cR2
D
+2λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)αcR2
D

>

(1 − λ)2α2cR2
D
+2λ(1 − λ)αcR2
D

(1 − λ)2α2 > 0 (97)
39Therefore, Inequality (94) holds, which completes the proof.
A.5. Proof of Corollary 4.5
If Kτ
0 > K∗ and Condition (34) holds, choosing the amount Kτ
0 of interbank deposits
dominates the alternative of having no interbank exposure since
U0(K > K∗) > U0(K ≤ K∗)
" 
α(1 + λ) + λ2(1 − 2α) − α2λ(1 − λ)

cR2
D
+λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)2R + α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR2
D
K
τ
0
c+Kτ
0 − τKτ
0
#
> [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (98)
After inserting the expression in Eq. (13) for R2
D, we can simplify the left hand side and
the inequality becomes:



α + λ(1 − α)c −
α(1−c)
α+λ(1−α)

R
+α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR2
D
cK
τ
0
(c+Kτ
0 )2 − τKτ
0

 > [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR
α(1 − λ)(1 − α)

R
(1 − c)
α + λ(1 − α)
+ cR2
D
Kτ
0
c + Kτ
0

> τKτ
0 (99)
The ﬁrst term on the left hand side is strictly positive. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show
that the second term on the left hand is larger than the right hand side to prove that the
inequality holds:
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)cR2
D
Kτ
0
c + Kτ
0
> τKτ
0
R2
D
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)
τ
c − c > Kτ
0
R2
D
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)
τ
c >
r
R2
D
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)
τ
c
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R2
D > τ (100)
Since Condition (34) implies the last line, it holds that U0(K > K∗) > U0(K ≤ K∗).
Hence, if Kτ
0 > K∗ and Condition (34) holds, the banks will choose to have the interbank
exposure Kτ
0. If, on the other hand, the Condition does not hold, they will chose to have
no interbank exposure.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4.6
To determine whether banks still prefer correlated investments after transaction costs
are added to the model, we compare the utility of the uninsured creditors for both types
of investment correlations. First, we consider the case that Condition (34) as well as
Kτ
0 > K∗ holds:
U1 > U0
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)cR
Kτ
1
c + Kτ
1

− τKτ
1 >




α(1 + λ) + λ2(1 − 2α) − α2λ(1 − λ)

cR2
D
+λ(1 − λ)(1 − α)2R
+α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR2
D
K
τ
0
c+Kτ
0 − τKτ
0



(101)
40After inserting the expression in Eq. (13) for R2
D, we can simplify the right hand side and
the inequality becomes:
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)cR
Kτ
1
c + Kτ
1

− τKτ
1 >



α + λ(1 − α)c −
α(1−c)
α+λ(1−α)

R
+α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR2
D
cK
τ
0
(c+Kτ
0 )2 − τKτ
0


(102)
Now, we will ﬁrst show that U1(Kτ
0) > U1. From U1 > U1(Kτ
0) then follows U1 > U0.
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)cR
Kτ
0
c + Kτ
0

− τKτ
0 >



α + λ(1 − α)c −
α(1−c)
α+λ(1−α)

R
+α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR2
D
cK
τ
0
(c+Kτ
0 )2 − τKτ
0


α(1 − λ)(1 − α)

R
(1 − c)
α + λ(1 − α)
+ cR
Kτ
0
c + Kτ
0

> α(1 − λ)(1 − α)cR2
D
Kτ
0
c + Kτ
0
(103)
Since the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is positive and R > R2
D, it follows that U1(Kτ
0) >
U1. Therefore, it is always true that U1 > U0 if Condition (34) as well as Kτ
0 > K∗ hold.
Next, we consider the case in which Condition (27) does hold, but Condition (34) is
not satisﬁed or Kτ
0 ≤ K∗.
U1 > U0
λcR + (1 − λ)

αcR + α(1 − α)cR
Kτ
1
c + Kτ
1

− τKτ
1 > [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)cR
Kτ
1
c + Kτ
1
− τKτ
1 > 0
R
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)
τ
c − c > Kτ
1
R
(1 − λ)α(1 − α)
τ
c >
r
R
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)
τ
c
α(1 − α)(1 − λ)R > τ (104)
Since Condition (27) implies the last line, it also holds in this case that U1 > U0. Finally,
we check the case in which Condition (27) does not hold. In this case the banks chose an
interbank exposure of zero for both types of investment correlation, which implies that
U1 = U0 = [λ + (1 − λ)α]cR (105)
41A.7. Proof of Proposition 5.1
In the following, we compare the critical bailout probabilities for the case without (α∗)
and with interbank network (α∗∗). By plugging in the critical values derived in Section
5, one can see that:
α∗ > α∗∗
1 − λNRN
D
(1 − λN)RN
D
>
c + 2K
2K
−
s
(c + 2K)2
4K2 −
(c + K)(RN
DλN − 1)
KRN
D(λN − 1)
s
(c + 2K)2
4K2 −
(c + K)(RN
DλN − 1)
KRN
D(λN − 1)
>
c + 2K
2K
−
1 − λNRN
D
(1 − λN)RN
D
(c + 2K)2
4K2 −
(c + K)(RN
DλN − 1)
KRN
D(λN − 1)
>

c + 2K
2K
−
1 − λNRN
D
(1 − λN)RN
D
2
(c + 2K)(1 − λNRN
D)
K(1 − λN)RN
D
−
(c + K)(RN
DλN − 1)
KRN
D(λN − 1)
>

1 − λNRN
D
(1 − λN)RN
D
2
K(1 − λNRN
D)
K(1 − λN)RN
D
>

1 − λNRN
D
(1 − λN)RN
D
2
RN
D − λNRN
D > 1 − λNRN
D
RN
D > 1 (106)
This last inequality is always true. This completes the proof.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 6.1
To show that UDI > UBI holds, it is suﬃcient to compare the respective cash ﬂows
in case the investments fail, since the success states are equal for both cases. Hence, we
have to show that


αBcR + (1 − αB)αBcR K1
c+K1
+(1 − αB)2αBcR K1
2
(c+K1)2

 >


αBcR + (1 − αB)α2
BcR 2KBI
c+2KBI
+2(1 − αB)2αBcR KBI
cKBI

 (107)
After subtracting αBcR and canceling out (1 − αB)αB the inequality becomes
K1
c + K1
+ (1 − αB)
K1
2
(c + K1)2 > αB
2KBI
c + 2KBI
+ 2(1 − αB)
KBI
cKBI
(108)
Then, we use the information that KBI = 1/2K1 to get
K1
c + K1
+ (1 − αB)
K1
2
(c + K1)2 > αB
K1
c + K1
+ (1 − αB)
K1
c + 1
2K1
K1
2c(1 − α)
(c + K1)2(2c + K1)
> 0 (109)
Since in the last line all terms on the left hand side are always positive, it holds that
UDI > UBI. This completes the proof.
42A.9. Discussion of optimal consumption with risk-averse creditors and positive bailout
probability
To understand why the optimal consumption decreases in t = 1 if a bailout is possible,
ﬁrst note that a bailout simply changes the probability distribution of the investment.
Without bailout creditors receive funds for consumption only with probability λ at t = 2.
Now if the investment fails there is still a positive probability that creditors receive (at
least parts of) their funds. To fully capture the optimal consumption decision, we look
at a situation in which the investment returns and respective probabilities match exactly
those of the risky investment considered in the paper when there is a positive bailout
probability.
max
x,y,c,RD
U = γu(c) + (1 − γ)[λu(cRD) + (1 − λ)[αu(cRD) + α(1 − α)u(θcRD)]] (110)
subject to
x + y ≤ n, γ 2nc ≤ 2y, (1 − γ)2ncRD ≤ 2xR, (111)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, RD ≥ 0. (112)
Since the constraints in the respective periods again have to be binding, we can solve
them for c and RD, respectively and can plug these values into the objective function,
which yields:
max
y U = γu
 
y
γn
!
+ (1 − γ)

 λu

R(n−y)
(1−γ)n

+(1 − λ)
h
αu

R(n−y)
(1−γ)n

+ α(1 − α)u

θ
R(n−y)
(1−γ)n
i

 (113)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to y then yields:
u
0
 
y
γn
!
= u
0
 
R(n − y)
(1 − γ)n
!
[λR + (1 − λαR)] + (1 − λ)θRαu
 
θ
R(n − y)
(1 − γ)n
!
(114)
Looking at this ﬁrst order condition one can see that the marginal utility of consumption
at t = 1 is higher now, implying that consumption is lower. Hence, if it is more likely
to get the higher repayment at t = 2 creditors want to shift more consumption to this
later period. This completes the discussion of the optimal consumption allocation with
risk-averse creditors and positive bailout probability.
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